Mandelbaum: criticism of anti-essentialism in art and its problematic interpretation of the wittgensteinian notion of family resemblance

Abstract

This article addresses Maurice Mandelbaum's criticism of anti-essentialism in Wittgensteinian-oriented art. Mandelbaum criticizes the common position of Paul Ziff, Morris Weitz and Willian Kennick according to which the definition of the concept of art cannot be established in essentialist terms. According to Mandelbaum, the anti-essentialist thesis fails because it is based on observable properties to claim that there is no necessary and sufficient property that runs through the set of all works of art. In this sense, the definition of the concept of art could be established through relational properties. Mandelbaum's attack focuses on the notion of family resemblance developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations. In his interpretation of that notion, Mandelbaum assumes that Wittgenstein would be referring to directly displayed properties. However, the article argues that Mandelbaum's critique is not justified as it ignores the distinction between seeing and seeing as that Wittgenstein himself performs in passage XI of his mentioned work.