The demarcation problem’s three phases

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.31977/grirfi.v22i1.2704

Keywords:

Demarcation Problem; Science; Pseudoscience; Demarcation Criteria.

Abstract

 

This article seeks to achieve two goals. First, to present a panoramic analysis of the three main contemporary conceptions about the demarcation problem. Traditionally, the demarcation problem has intended to conceptually delimit the boundaries between “science”, “non-science” and/or “pseudoscience” via criteria and definitions of science or scientificity. This issue – mainly in the 20th century, but not only – was present as one of the great intellectual challenges of the philosophy of science and in related areas. Indeed, our analysis has produced a division that selects three main phases, namely, optimistic perspectives, pessimistic perspectives, and, so to speak, hybrid perspectives. In light of this context, and in order to support the general architecture of the article, two authors from each phase were chosen for a schematic analysis. Second, this article seeks, in the end, to argue that the problem of demarcation is better understood and answered if characterized as more than an exclusively methodological and epistemological problem, that is, in this sense it would also be a value-added problem with political, social and therefore, practical. We termed it the dual dimension of the demarcation problem. Furthermore, we highlight that our emphasis on this interpretation is essentially in accordance with the defense made by the third approach analyzed in this paper. In the end, we defend that the third conception outlined here is a comparatively better alternative than the others.



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Author Biography

Robson Carvalho, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)

Doutorando(a) Em Filosofia na Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC), Florianópolis – SC, Brasil. Bolsista do(a): Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES), Brasil.

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Published

2022-02-27

How to Cite

CARVALHO, Robson. The demarcation problem’s three phases. Griot : Revista de Filosofia, [S. l.], v. 22, n. 1, p. 227–250, 2022. DOI: 10.31977/grirfi.v22i1.2704. Disponível em: https://periodicos.ufrb.edu.br/index.php/griot/article/view/2704. Acesso em: 21 nov. 2024.

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