The cognitive subject in I. Kant’s philosophy: characteristics, limits, and legacy

Résumé

The cognitive subject in I. Kant's philosophy occupies a central position in the development of modern epistemology, marking a decisive shift from object-centered to subject-centered theories of knowledge. This article investigates the key characteristics of Kant’s cognitive subject through a critical analysis of his major works, particularly Critique of Pure Reason, and situates it within the broader context of Enlightenment thought. The study applies dialectical and historical materialist methodology to reveal six defining features: (1) the cognitive subject is formed through Kant’s critical method, emphasizing self-reflection and the limits of reason; (2) it is proactive, dynamic, and creative, not a passive recipient of external stimuli; (3) it raises foundational questions about dialectical logic and the conditions of knowledge; (4) it is speculative and ahistorical, reflecting Enlightenment individualism; (5) it is characterized by epistemological limits, as Kant asserts the unknowability of the “thing-in-itself”; and (6) it unifies the cognitive, moral, and aesthetic dimensions of the human subject. The article also critically examines the legacy of Kant’s conception, highlighting both its enduring influence on epistemology and its limitations, particularly the abstraction from social and historical context.