Modern art in dispute. appearance and reconciliation

Abstract

 In the present articles we will analyze the way in which Dieter Henrich interprets the aesthetic conception of Hegel. As we shall see, the author considers that, during the last years of his life, Hegel revised his position contrary to modern art and developed a favorable interpretation of it. Henrich discovers in Hegel's intuitions about objective humor an appropriate starting point for thinking about a non-sovereign conception of subjectivity and for developing an affirmative aesthetic of truth. To do this, however, he not only departs from the assumptions of Hegelian aesthetics but also projects traditional categories on modern art and contemporary art. For this reason, after reviewing Henrich's critiques of reflexive theories of consciousness and reconstructing the way in which he understands the relation between art and subjectivity, we will delineate some considerations concerning the difficulties that are contained in his tendency to ignore the radical autonomy of modern art. As we will argue, Henrich denies the critical moments of modernity by neutralizing his possible excesses and constructs a theory of modern art that can no longer be faithful to its constitutive ambiguity.