Assumptions and critical assessment of the Habermas's analysis on subjectivity and the thesis of individuation through socialization

Abstract

This paper aims to raise some arguments used by Habermas in his Postmetaphysical Thinking so that we can from this make a critical assessment of the role he claims to the problem of subjectivity in the light of his thesis of individuation by socialization. First, we will present the theoretical and historical assumptions on which the Habermasian project is based, for example, Habermas' use of Mead's social theory, and then compare it to the tradition to which it was opposed. We will then try to clarify certain trends of the time, reinforced mainly by Habermas' theory, such as the notion of reducing subjectivity to socialization, comparing them with the main elements of the metaphysical theories of subjectivity that had dominated the discourse of modernity. As we will see, the midpoint that bifurcates both perspectives will be the attitude with which each one behaves in the face of problems arising from the reflexive circle of subjectivity, thematizing the possibility of a non-propositional knowledge.