Ideal and non-ideal theories of justice as components of realistic utopias

Abstract

This article examines the division of theories of justice into ideal and non-ideal categories, the resulting impasses, and the hypothesis of a necessary complementarity between the two to form complete theories of justice that are simultaneously utopian and realistic. Initially, this issue will be mapped out based on this division, as elaborated by John Rawls, and on a survey of the leading positions in the subsequent debate, which consolidated as a belief in the insurmountable opposition between two opposing forms of theory. Then, this work will propose definitions of the structures and descriptions of the functions of these two types of theories. Adopting Rawls's position, ideal theories of justice will be considered as normative theories that depend on idealizations, but which constitute the normative horizon and establish the ultimate goal of the numerous non-ideal theories that are potentially compatible with the former. Non-ideal theories of justice will be interpreted, beyond Rawls, as consisting of a dual structure, with a scientifically informed descriptive part and a normative part, derived from the general normativity of the corresponding ideal theory, which partially determines its descriptive part. Finally, an attempt to resolve the opposition between the two will be suggested, with the hypothesis that ideal theories of justice must be complemented by an indeterminate number of compatible non-ideal theories of justice, which will combat specific injustices identifiable only descriptively, but precisely based on the fundamental values ​​and objectives specified by a theory of the first type, thus forming complete theories of justice, the only ones that could claim the utopian realist character advocated by Rawls.