Percepción social directa de emociones e influencias cognitivas
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.31977/grirfi.v24i3.4933Palabras clave:
Percepción social directa; Reconocimiento de emociones; Penetrabilidad cognitiva.Resumen
En este artículo me propongo examinar algunos casos de reconocimiento de emociones que parecieran estar constreñidos por información cognitiva de algún tipo. Usualmente, se ha explicado al reconocimiento de emociones como una habilidad directa, no-inferencial, que descansa en la detección de un conjunto de información perceptiva de carácter multimodal. No obstante, existe evidencia empírica relativa al reconocimiento de emociones que no pareciera ser explicada fácilmente por los enfoques no-inferencialistas debido a que existe algún tipo de influencia top-down entre cierto tipo estados cognitivos y perceptuales que desafía el carácter directo o no inferencial de esta habilidad. Específicamente, la integración de esa información podría involucrar mecanismos inferenciales o cognitivamente más demandantes que los propuestos por las teorías de la percepción directa de emociones. Particularmente, me refiero a la evidencia de la influencia que poseen los sesgos cognitivos, prejuicios y otras creencias en el reconocimiento de emociones. Propondré que estos casos de reconocimiento de emociones si pueden explicarse por medio de enfoques no inferencialistas si se apela a fenómenos como el de la penetrabilidad cognitiva.
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