A critical analysis of Fred Dretske's informational teleosemantics
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.31977/grirfi.v16i2.783Keywords:
Dretske; Representation; Informational teleosemantics; Belief.Abstract
I discuss in this paper the proposal of informational teleosemantics, as it was conceived by Fred Dretske. I sustain that, although informational teleosemantics faces serious difficulties concerning determination of the content of beliefs, it provides good criteria to distinguish merely informational systems from representational systems.
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References
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