The ressignification of perception and the intersubjectivity in Merleau-Ponty

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to show how the issue of inter-subjectivity is thought by Merleau-Ponty in terms of perception of the other. However, for this to be possible, it is necessary, first, to oppose the classical conceptions of perception, which dealt with the perception of the phenomenon either as an act of consciousness, or as a mere tool body. For Merleau-Ponty, conversely, the perception is for us the source of intelligibility, it is the condition of possibility for the structuring of knowledge. In addition to the existence of the other is not reduced to a mere projection of my mind, it is necessary to conceive the subjectivity no longer in Cartesian terms, as a substance (res cogitans), which builds the exterior with its power to judge . But as a corporeal subjectivity, rooted in the world, and that consciousness ceases to be the reserve status of the object and pass to perceptual awareness. Only in this way, so others may appear in my perception, because my perception never depletes perceived.