Scientific practice, values, and objectivity: could the ability to measure offer hope for objectivity in the social sciences?

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.31977/grirfi.v26i2.5803

Keywords:

Philosophy of measurement; Scientific objectivity; Values in Science; Philosophy of the social sciences.

Abstract

The philosophy of measurement has proven to be a fruitful area not only because of its autonomous interests, but also because of its contribution to classical reflections on the epistemology of science. Whether questioning, criticizing, or corroborating the epistemic theses in vogue, the area has actively contributed to strengthening a practical shift in the philosophy of science, which considers that understanding the nature of scientific knowledge requires systematic analyses—including philosophical questions—linked to its effective practices. In this text, I seek to show one of the ways in which the current literature on the philosophy of measurement has fitted in with the debates on the value-laden nature and objectivity of science, in particular by exploring analyses of measurement and the methodologies of the social sciences.

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Author Biography

Felix Pinheiro, Universidade Federal de Piauí (UFPI)

Doutor(a) em Filosofia pela Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC), Florianópolis – SC, Brasil. Professor(a) da Universidade Federal de Piauí (UFPI), Teresina – PI, Brasil.  

References

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Published

2026-06-28

How to Cite

PINHEIRO, Felix. Scientific practice, values, and objectivity: could the ability to measure offer hope for objectivity in the social sciences?. Griot : Revista de Filosofia, [S. l.], v. 26, n. 2, p. 66–79, 2026. DOI: 10.31977/grirfi.v26i2.5803. Disponível em: https://periodicos.ufrb.edu.br/index.php/griot/article/view/5803. Acesso em: 17 sep. 2026.

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