On dialectics and formal indication in ontology: hermeneutics of facticity

Abstract

This article aims to highlight Heidegger's limited interest in dialectics and its non-application in works such as Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity. We will show that, for the philosopher, especially there, the dialectical procedure is subject to criticism; the presentation of the terms of these criticisms constitutes a substantial part of our work. Based on this 1923 course in Fribourg, we will point out several instances in which Heidegger objects to dialectics, especially what results from it in a kind of “Platonism of barbarians,” in the philosophy of his time. To provide context for these analyses, we will seek to contrast the dialectical procedure with the phenomenological attitude adopted by Heidegger in his hermeneutic phenomenology of factical life. To that end, it will be necessary to introduce the concept of “formal indication,” which, although not very apparent in the work that supports us, is crucial as a method of Heideggerian philosophy during this period. As far as we can see, dialectics is properly the antithesis of phenomenology. Nevertheless, at the end of the article, we will indicate that, years earlier, the philosopher had considered a role for dialectics in his own philosophy, which gave rise to the proposal of a “diahermeneutics”. This idea will be revisited here, although it was never developed by the philosopher.