Is knowledge a fundamental condition for proper assertion?

Abstract

In this paper I consider two counterexamples by Jennifer Lackey (2007) to Knowledge norm of assertion (KNA) in order to argue that this norm is not fundamental to making epistemically appropriate assertions. The two counterexamples discussed involve what Lackey calls selfless assertion and misleading assertion. The selfless assertion are epistemically appropriate, but they are made without belief or with some doubt regarding the belief. Therefore, these are appropriate assertions that do not require knowledge of the asserted proposition, indicating that the KNA is not fundamental. Misleading assertions, on the other hand, are assertions made with knowledge of the asserted proposition, but the person making the assertion knows that it will lead the listener to form false beliefs. Such assertions should be prohibited, yet the KNA cannot prohibit them because they involve knowledge. This too suggests that the KNA is not fundamental to making appropriate assertions.