Embodied intentionality: a convergence between sartrean philosophy and sensorimotor enactivism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.31977/grirfi.v24i2.4804Keywords:
Intentionality; Enactivism; Sartre; Phenomenology; Embodied Cognition; Externalism.Abstract
In Sartrean philosophy, the body is a central element in explaining the nature of intentionality, that is, the nature of how our consciousness apprehends reality. His corporeal phenomenology aims to refute the followers of the Cartesian tradition of the mind. At the same time, in the contemporary philosophy of mind and cognition, supporters of the enactivist tradition seek to elucidate the body's central role in the constitution of cognition. Likewise, their opponents are the adherents of cognitivism, who see the locus of cognition in the brain as an informational processing device for symbolic (representational) content. In this article, we intend to develop a close relationship between the Sartrean conception of intentionality and that offered by sensorimotor enactivism. Both defend the centrality of the body in so-called "cognitive" or "mental" processes; both defend a kind of externalism about mental content; and both criticize the internalist and representationalist paradigm focused on internal processes only located in the brain. These similarities allow us to trace a relationship of continuity between Sartrean phenomenology and the embodied traditions of the mind.
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