Impulses in Horkheimer´s materialist notion of reason

Abstract

The present work addresses the relationship between the notions of reason (Vernunft) and impulse (Triebe) in Max Horkheimer. We will focus on the analysis of two texts from the 1930s to point out that the philosopher rejects the idea -typical of what he considers the bourgeois conception of reason- of a radical opposition between these concepts, since it is on its behalf that a repression of the impulsive is ussually carried in the name of an optimization of thought. Horkheimer understands that while such repression seeks to emancipate reason from its other, it produces, in fact, nothing more than an atrophy of thought. We will point out that, according to Horkheimer, the radical opposition is false for two reasons: on the one hand, because reason becomes impulsive when she limits herself to reasoning. On the other hand, because without a conscious connection between reason and impulse, reason becomes prey of irrationality. We argue that there is in Horkheimer a materialist conception of the relationship between the notions of drives and reason, according to which only the establishment of a conscious relationship between the two, which does not neglect the satisfaction of impulsive demands, can prevent thinking from becoming irrational.