The distinction between divergences and oppositions in traditions of philosophy of science: examining the supposed conflicts of scientific realism

Abstract

In this article, I investigate the supposed oppositions (or controversies) in the philosophy of science, particularly between scientific realism and other traditions of thought, such as scientific antirealism, socioconstructivism, and the historiographic conception. My analysis begins by questioning whether all conceptual divergences in philosophy should be interpreted as oppositions between explanatory proposals or as cases of divergent perspectives on the conceptualized object and the problems to be addressed. I argue that effective oppositions arise only when there is a core of shared questions, assumptions, and interests between two or more schools of thought. The article is structured in four sections: in the first, I discuss perspectivism in philosophy; in the second, I explore the distinction between divergence and opposition (or controversy); in the third, I examine the central problems, fundamental assumptions, explanatory objectives, and key concepts of the aforementioned schools to assess whether they represent divergences or oppositions; and in the fourth and final section, I argue that only antirealism stands as an opponent to scientific realism, while offering a hypothesis about why scientific realism regards other different positions as adversaries. In the concluding remarks, I emphasize the importance of distinguishing between conceptual divergences and effective oppositions, and I advocate for an epistemological pluralism in the philosophy of science in accordance with the nature of philosophy as a practice of creating concepts based on problems.