The principle of alternative possibilities
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.31977/grirfi.v19i2.1177Keywords:
Moral Responsibility; Freedom; Determinism.Abstract
In 1969, when “Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” (1969) was published, Harry Frankfurt changed the course of the discussion about the free will problem. Frankfurt showed, through some thought experiments, agents that, he argued, were moral responsible for their actions even though they could not have acted otherwise. Frankfurt’s essay pushed several philosophers, remarkably John Fischer, to rethink the problem of moral responsibility. For Fischer, Frankfurt showed that the debate should not be about the compatibility between freedom and determinism, but rather should address the question of whether moral responsibility is compatible with determinism.
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