Griot : Revista de Filosofia, Amargosa - BA, v.24, n.1, p.29.49, fevereiro, 2024 ISSN 2178-1036
https://doi.org/10.31977/grirfi.v24i1.3572
Recebido: 19/09/2023 | Aprovado: 30/01/2024
Received: 09/19/2023 | Approved: 01/30/2024

EXPLANATORY PHENOMENAL NAÏVE REALISM MUST BE NON-OBJECTIVIST

Ícaro Miguel Ibiapina Machado[1]
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1759-2930
E-mail: ícaro_machado@live.com

ABSTRACT:
This study focuses on a particular type of Naïve Realism known as objectivism, which suggests that the explanation of perceptual phenomenology is based on environmental things that the subject becomes acquainted with. Section 2 introduces a subtype of objectivism, "selectivism", which aims to overcome a traditional kind of objection. However, this section highlights that the cases these objections invoke may still posit challenges (demands for explanations) to selectivism. Section 3 discusses a recent objection to objectivism and demonstrates how it can be addressed by selectivism so becomes only a challenge of this kind. However, it is important to note that, despite not providing positive refutations, these challenges are still significant. Sections 4 and 5 present the main contribution of this study, as they provide novel arguments that conclusively refute objectivism. Section 4 presents an argument that shows the falsity of objectivism as it has been presented in the literature. Nevertheless, a modified version of objectivism is proposed that could address it, although it still faces some non-definitive challenges. This reformulated theory is a novel type within the realm of Naïve Realism as a whole, as it posits that perceptions involve acquaintance with facts relative to sense organs. In contrast, Section 5 proposes an argument that positively refutes objectivism, which cannot be salvaged by any modification. Section 6 raises objections to an alternative option of Naïve Realism and, also based on the issues raised earlier in the article regarding objectivism, concludes that Naïve Realism must be subjectivist.

KEYWORDS: Naïve Realism; Phenomenal Character; Sensory Perception; Acquaintance; Selectivism.
.
.

[1] Doutor(a) em Filosofia pela Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC), Florianópolis – SC, Brasil.

Artigo publicado em acesso aberto sob a licença Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License

Introduction

Naive Realism has been argued to have some important advantages. First, it is arguably in tune with our ordinary conceptions and intuitions about perceptions (MARTIN, 2002, 2006; CRANE, 2006; FISH, 2009). Second, it is arguably in tune with introspective data concerning perceptions (CRANE, 2005; NUDDS, 2009; HILL, 2009). Third, it arguably accounts for knowledge of the external world (MCDOWELL, 1992, 2008)). Fourth, it arguably accounts for demonstrative thought (CAMPBELL, 2002, 2009, 2011)). Fifth, it arguably accounts for the conception of mind-independent things (BREWER 2011). This list is not exhaustive, but it is enough to show the merits that Naïve Realism may have.

Although often considered a unitary thesis, Raineri (2021) suggests that this approach comes in two flavors: Ontological Naïve Realism, which pertains to the nature of perceptual and illusory experiences, and Phenomenal Naïve Realism (PNR). This paper exclusively focuses on the latter type of naïve-realistic view.

In this context, I take PNRs as referring to *explanatory* theses regarding the phenomenology of perceptions (and illusions[2])[3-4]. I will take "phenomenally fundamental properties" (PFPs) as simply the properties whose instantiations metaphysically ground the phenomenology perceptions phenomenology[5]. The nature of PFPs can be characterized in different ways depending on the specific explanatory approach taken regarding the phenomenology of perceptions. For example, sense data theorists may define them as the class of properties associated with the subject becoming acquainted with mental images. PNRs, instead, take the class of PNRs as at least partially[6] composed of properties whose instantiations involve acquaintances by the associated subjects with mind-independent things. I use the term "naïve-realistic properties" to refer to features that are characterized in this way.

This general characterization, however, allows for the possibility of many distinct types of naïve-realistic PNRs. For example, some PNR may introduce PFPs taking into account the everyday intuition that "two ordinary observers standing in roughly the same place, looking at the same scene, are bound to

[2]Depending on the specific version of PNR, its explananda can either be veridical perceptions or a combination of veridical perceptions and illusions. However, for the sake of brevity, I will only refer to the first option when discussing PNR as a whole.

[3] Strictly speaking, there are two types of Phenomenological Naïve Realism positions. The first, possibly referred to as "Phenomenological-Constitutive Naïve Realism", considers the phenomenology of perceptions as individuated by types of mind-independent entities. This form of phenomenological externalism is present in Langsam (2017), Soteriou (2010, 2013, 2016), and Kennedy (2013), among others. The second form, "Explanatory Phenomenological Naïve Realism", metaphysically explains phenomenological facts in perceptions as resulting from instantiations of naïve-realistic properties. The in-virtue-of or metaphysically grounding relation, as described in Audi's (2012a, 2012b) account, is instantiated in metaphysical explanations (of a non-causal nature) of this type. This is the case when we say, for example, that an action x is morally wrong (partially) in virtue of x's instantiating certain non-moral properties (e.g., the property of being a lie). Although there is no consensus on how to characterize the in-virtue-of relation, one feature that indisputably belongs to this relation is that, for every x, F, and G, if x's being F is in virtue of x's being G, then necessarily, every G is an F. In conclusion, the crucial difference between Phenomenological-Constitutive and Explanatory Phenomenal Naive Realism is a necessity versus sufficiency distinction. The former attributes the necessity of certain types of mind-independent entities to the phenomenology of perceptions, whereas the latter attributes (partial) sufficiency. Therefore, the latter type of theory does not need to fix phenomenologies to specific kinds of mind-independent things. Different naïve-realistic facts, each with distinct types of mind-independent things, can metaphysically ground the same type of phenomenological fact.

[4] Here, I assume that phenomenological facts relative to some experience correspond to *exactly* what it is like to undergo that experience (CHALMERS, 2006). The properties that are relative to these facts (their "phenomenal *character*") are, as Byrne (2002, p. 9) highlights, maximally determinates. If two distinct experiences, x and y have the same phenomenology in this sense, then what it is like to have an experience is exactly the same thing as what it is like to have experience y. However, this not to be the only kind of relevant phenomenological properties and facts. For example, we can have many experiences that share similar "partial" phenomenological properties, such as red and circular appearances, but are still subjectively discriminable. Unless otherwise specified (as in Section 3), the first sense is the standard interpretation of "phenomenology" and related terms.

[5] To adhere to common usage, which assumes that if one fact is in virtue of another, they involve the same particular, it follows that since phenomenological facts pertain to the experience itself, the fact that explains it would also involve the experience. In this case, PFPs are instantiated by the corresponding experiences.

[6] Some versions of PNR allow for the possibility of perceptual phenomenology being overdetermined (LOGUE, 2014), meaning that naïve-realistic properties would not be the sole explanatory factor.

have experiences with the same phenomenal character" (CAMPBELL, 2002, p.116). Here, the standard position for PNR is to assert that (the naïve-realistic[7]) PFPs are such that each instantiation of any specific PFP involves acquaintance with "the same" things, and vice-versa[8]. Conversely, if two PFPs involve acquaintance with "distinct" things, then they would be numerically distinct and vice-versa. In this case, objectivists think that PFPs are of the form the property of the associated subject becoming acquainted with such-and-such environmental things or the property of the associated subject becoming acquainted with such-and-such kind of environmental things[9]. PNRs that posit PFPs as individuated in this way are referred to as "objectivism".

My general goal is to scrutinize objectivism. To achieve this goal, I will proceed as follows:

In Section 2, I will introduce a specific type of objectivism that has been designed to overcome a traditional objection. I will explain how the defensive strategy of this approach works and highlight some cases involved in these objections that could potentially pose challenges (demands for explanations that are not obviously obtainable by selectivists) to selectivism. Although these cases do not constitute positive refutations, they are still concerning.

In a similar vein, Section 3 will discuss a recent objection to objectivism that is not of the previous kind of objection, and will demonstrate how the objectivist can address it, ultimately reducing it to, at most, a challenge similar to the previous ones.

Sections 4 and 5, however, are the main contribution of this paper. These sections provide novel arguments that conclusively refute objectivism, which is different from the challenges discussed earlier.

Section 4 presents an argument that shows the falsity of objectivism as presented in the specialized literature up to this point. However, I also demonstrate that a modified version of objectivism could potentially address this argument (although it still faces some challenges). This reformulated theory is a novel type within not only the realm of objectivism, but also the one of Naïve Realism as a whole, as it posits that perceptions necessarily involve acquaintance with facts relative to sense organs. The significance of Section 4 and its argument lies in the conclusion that objectivism must adopt this new type of naïve realism.

Section 5, on the other hand, proposes an argument that positively refutes objectivism, which arguably cannot be salvaged by any modification. In Section 6, objections to the alternative option of PNR (which involves a third slot in the acquaintance relation) are raised. Based on these objections and the issues raised earlier in the article regarding objectivism, it is concluded that PNR must be subjectivist.

Selectivism saves objectivism from many objections

The traditional type of resistance to objectivism (TROs, hereafter) shows a set (often, a pair) of perceptual situations that have certain phenomenological distinctions, but arguably no available distinction of the acquainted things and so they would have the same PFPs. As I showed in Note 2, the *in-virtue-of* relation has a generality aspect, entailing that experiences with the same PFP have the same phenomenology. So those cases serve as counterexamples to objectivism. Here are the classical pairs of situations used in TROs:

[7] For the sake of brevity, I will use the term "PNRs" to refer specifically to the naïve-realistic properties introduced by a particular type of objectivism. I will not consider the possibility of this type of objectivism positing non-naïve-realistic properties, as this is not relevant to the current discussion.

[8] I.e., if acquaintances with the "same" things are involved in two instantiations, then the PFPs instantiated by the corresponding experiences are the same property.

[9] Objectivism admits a distinction of interpretation concerning "same" and "distinct" in these claims. If "same" and "distinct" here are taken as implying numerical identity/distinction, then objectivism takes particularistic forms. In this case, PFPs would include things like the property of the associated subject becoming acquainted with my laptop screen. Alternatively, if we read these concepts in terms of sameness in some pre-established kind (e.g., visual properties), then objectivism adopts a generalistic form of PNR, and PFPs would be properties such as the property of associated subject becoming acquainted with something square and gray, etc.(This classification is similar to that found in Mehta (2014, p.311-2), though it differs in relevant ways. However, the discussion below will be neutral with respect to these specificities.

1) The same things perceived by both healthy and "defective"[10] perceivers (CASSAM, 2014, p. 110).
2) The same things seen from different perspectives or angles (AYER, 1956).
3) The same things seen over appearance changes (especially those due to the passage of time) (BREWER, 2011, chap.5).
4) The same things seen in distinct lighting conditions (BREWER, 2011, chap.5).
5) The same things perceived through different senses modalities (CHRISTY, 2019; Mehta, 2014).
6) The same things seen both with and without attentional blindness[11].

There is at least one sense[12] according to which each of those scenarios would involve the "same" acquainted things and so they might be considered as yielding TROs. To avoid inconsistency, objectivists have to show why these pairs of situations are actually composed of distinct PFPs.

William Fish (2009) thinks that objectivism can be saved from TROs if we a) see the acquaintance relation as having environmental facts as objective relata and b) consider that subjective aspects determine which environmental facts we are acquainted with. Objectivists that subscribe to both a) and b) are selectivists. Selectivists typically explain the phenomenological distinctions between members of pairs 1-6) by claiming that there are distinctions in the specific combination of facts that the subjects become acquainted with, which (even for subjects in the same environment) can vary in accordance with distinctions in subjective aspects[13].

Thus, they can comfortably explain why, for example, when you (a shortsighted person) look at a picture on a distant wall, your experience is phenomenologically different from when you put on your glasses in the next moment. For selectivists, this is because of a distinction in subjective receptivity between these two moments. In the first moment, you became acquainted with certain facts about the picture's details, while in the second perception, you become acquainted with a surplus of facts (due to "receptivity" properties you have acquired) resulting in a distinct phenomenology. This is their standard explanation for cases of type 1).

Fish thinks selectivist can explain in a similar way differences in shape phenomenology from the same objects (as in 2)) in terms of the "intrinsic shape that a particular is (a way of filling out space) and the relational shape that it exhibits to a perceiver looking at the particular from a specific point" (Fish, 2009, p. 160). These latter properties correspond to the way some surface is projected in an outer point according to laws of projective geometry and are purely environmental, as defined by Gibson (1966)[14]. When a person changes position relative to the thing I am looking at, there is, according to Fish, a necessary change in environmental perspectival facts they are acquainted with, and therefore, selectivists would not have to predict a corresponding identity in phenomenologies.

The same kind of response can be provided to account for the distinction in color phenomenologies in scenarios of type 3). In this case, the explanation would be based on a distinction of facts relative to the wavelength of the light that the objects reflect "and the ratio

[10] Myopia, color blindness, yellow eye, partial deafness, etc. Here we can also include cases with light-distorting lenses.
[11] For real-world examples that suggest events of distinct phenomenologies, even with (allegedly) equivalent perceived things (SIMONS & CHABRIS (1999), MACK & ROCK (1998), CARRASCO et al. (2004)). Fish (2009) discusses the consequence of this type of cases for naïve realism, naturally providing a objectivist explanation.
[12] The one of "same" composing the descriptions that evoke those pairs of cases.
[13] This is why this approach is labeled "selectivism". The subjects have the power of selecting which environmental facts they become acquainted with.
[14] See also Alva Noë's (2004) "perspectival properties".

of the different elements of this color signal to the corresponding elements of the color signal reflected from the surround" (FISH, 2009, p.153)[15].

Based on this understanding, it is clear why the perceptual phenomenology corresponding to an old and blackened coin may differ from that of a new one. The coin's surface has undergone chemical changes over time, altering the way it reflects light. Consequently, there is a change in the facts related to the wavelength that the coin reflects, which one becomes acquainted with at two different times. As demonstrated, selectivists can also explain phenomenological variations relative to things that have changed shape over time. Therefore, type 4) cases should not be worrisome to selectivists.

It is far from obvious, however, that TROs are, in general, harmless to selectivism. For example, one might suggest that it is possible to touch the exact same things that we see, which would make selectivist inconsistent with the obvious fact that perceptions of distinct sense modalities always have distinct phenomenologies. However, as Christy (2019, p.2183-4) highlights, selectivists can appeal to alleged types of "modally-specific" facts that are, in addition, necessary for whatever experience of certain sense modality. An application of this strategy is to claim that all and only visual experience involves acquaintance (objective) color facts. Thus, the appeal to modally-specific facts offers a way for selectivists to account for the distinct phenomenologies in type 5) cases.

A further issue that selectivists face is accounting for type 6) situations, in which a perceiver is attentionally blind to certain aspects of their environment. The natural selectivist explanation, which is similar to that used for type 1) cases, holds that the perceiver fails to become acquainted with environmental aspects that they would have become acquainted with had they not had the attentional deficit at that moment.

However, it is not entirely clear that the previous two responses are satisfactory. To illustrate, consider the glasses-wearing/removal situation I mentioned when discussing selectivists' response to type 1). Now imagine that in a third moment, while still wearing your glasses, you become distracted and become attentionally blind to the *same* aspects of the picture that you were not acquainted with in the first moment due to your vision impairment. However, the phenomenologies of the first and third situations are distinct (to begin with, there is no blurriness in the latter case).

Notwithstanding, selectivists could use the same strategy deployed in type 5) cases and deny that, even in the same environment, the facts that we fail to get acquainted with in attentional blindness situations are the same as the ones we fail to get acquainted with in defective scenarios. To support this claim, they could appeal to two options. First, they would have to abandon the intuitive account for selectivism, which holds that if S is attentionally blind to some fact F, then S fails to become acquainted with F, and if S is "visually" blind to some fact F, then S fails to become acquainted with F. Second, they could argue that it is *necessary* to be attentionally blind and visually impaired with respect to different things.

Both options certainly pose a great burden. With the first option, selectivists would need to provide an alternative non-ad hoc account for how we determine which objects in the environment one becomes acquainted with and which one is not, in situations of attentional blindness, or a similar account for sensory impairment. (Or at least indicate a non-ad-hoc general way we come to an account like that, since the phenomenological presence of things[16] seems to be

[15] See also Fish (2009, chap.6, sect. 2)), Cohen (2004) and Byrne and Hilbert (1997)

[16] Roughly, this principle, which seems to guide our natural attributions of what are the elements of the can be expressed in "if S is acquainted with something in the environment, then such a thing is phenomenologically present".

.

.

our only current criteria for determining what one becomes acquainted with, so a new strategy is required). The second option also poses the burden of providing some reason why one cannot be (in different situations) attentionally and visually blind to the exact same things (while also being "sighted" in relation to the same things).

Selectivists' treatment of type 5) cases raises similar concerns. While there may be a type of fact exclusive and necessary to vision (such as color facts), it is unclear whether this generalizes to other sensory modalities. As a result, selectivists still need to provide reasons for the existence of such types of facts across all (possible and existent) sensory modalities.

To my knowledge, selectivists have yet to address any of these concerns.

Objections from partial phenomenology

The previous section highlighted some challenges to selectivism. Nevertheless, as of now, there has not been any affirmative stance against it.

Thus, it may be reasonable for antiselectivists to consider objections other than TROs. A more recent objection recognizes that although PNRs are concerned with the total phenomenology of perception, they must also address its partial phenomenology[17]. Once this is accepted, it becomes natural to think that these partial phenomenological facts are accounted for by the perceiver's becoming acquainted with specific environmental facts[18]. Indeed, as I showed in Section 2, Fish (2009) himself gave selectivists many suggestions for explaining color and shape phenomenology.

These observations may relieve antiselectivists from assuming that the counterexamples to selectivism demand the exact same acquainted facts. Instead, selectivists would expect perceptions that only share some acquainted facts to be phenomenologically similar. If antiselectivists can demonstrate that these experiences are not actually phenomenologically similar, then they have a counterexample to selectivism.

In this line, Mehta (2014) [19] argues that even if it is not possible for experiences of different sense modalities to involve exactly the same acquainted things (as argued by selectivists), it is undeniable that two perceptions of distinct sense modalities can involve acquaintance with some common fact[20]. For example, ways of filling out space, as Fish partially sees what explains shape phenomenology, seem to be a type of fact with which we can become acquainted both tactilely and visually. Mehta believes that this possibility obliges objectivists to predict some phenomenal similarity among the cases, which is not the case, as visual and tactile experiences are utterly[21] subjectively different.

One problem with this argument is that it assumes that selectivists must accept that two perceptions involving acquaintances with something in common are necessarily phenomenologically similar. This assumption is based on the idea that selectivists assume the objective relata in the acquaintance relation are not "phenomenally innocuous". In other words,

[17] Partial phenomenology is what is instantiated by two experiences that are phenomenologically similar but not necessarily identical. Color and shape phenomenologies are the most prominent examples of these properties.

[18] For the relation between partial phenomenology (facts), phenomenological similarities and total phenomenology, see Note 3.

[19] See also Mehta and Ganson (2016) and Clarke and Anaya (2019).

[20] But not simply a fact of a type that would be present in every perceptual acquaintance (e.g., something's being a physical object). This restriction is important because PNRs could gladly indicate that those "general facts" are the ones whose acquaintance is merely responsible for a general sensory phenomenal aspect. Here, that which matters is phenomenological facts that are specific to only certain experiences.

[21] At least in relation to phenomenological aspects that are not shared by all perceptions (which distinguishes sensory phenomenology from other types of phenomenal experiences, such as pain and imagination).

they would need to accept the "impact principle" – the idea that everything we become acquainted with has some specific impact on, or participation in, at least the partial phenomenology of the corresponding experience[22]. Otherwise, they could not explain the difference in phenomenology between two experiencers by simply citing some fact that one of them does not become acquainted with, while the other one does (as in explanations of type 1-6 cases).

While the present argument is compelling, objectivists have ways to refute it. For one, objectivists do not need to give up on the motivation behind the impact principle, which is to avoid "phenomenal innocuousness".

First and foremost, it is inevitable to read "…has an impact on..." in terms of "…determines…" within the current context. However, when we say that something has *some* impact on another, we do not mean that necessarily the first thing does all the relevant determinative work alone. Rather, it is compatible with the first thing's being only *partially* determinative, serving a non-totalizing part of what ultimately does the entire determinative job. Interpreted this way, the impact principle implies that every acquainted fact composes (either partially or totally) the determinant of some corresponding instantiation of a (partial or total) phenomenal property. This is contrary to the antiselectivist reasoning that suggests the corresponding acquaintance of the "impactful" thing fully determines the instantiation of a phenomenal property.

Note that this interpretation does not conflict with the original motivation behind the impact principle. If the subject is no longer acquainted with the same things, then what was responsible (considered as a whole) for doing the phenomenological determinative work is no longer present (as at least some part of it is now gone)[23]. Therefore, it is not surprising that the phenomenal aspect that was being generated thereof also ceases to exist, although this may give rise to some other phenomenal aspect that is (partially) determined by substitutive acquaintances.

Moreover, this interpretation should not seem unusual to selectivist accounts as presented in Section 2. In fact, selectivists could argue that this is a common occurrence in visual perception. Fish, for instance, posits that the same instantiation of a light-reflecting property can produce two distinct color phenomenologies depending on its surroundings. He also asserts that shape phenomenology is determined by the way space is filled *and* perspectival properties, and that only when those kinds of facts are acquainted together can they fully determine a specific shape phenomenology. Therefore, selectivists may be willing to accept that while there may be environmental facts that alone partially determine phenomenological aspects, this is not a universal phenomenon.

Therefore, the mere possibility of becoming acquainted with the same facts through distinct sense modalities would not, contrary to what Mehta suggests, lead selectivists to predict any phenomenological similarity. Selectivists, however, need to demonstrate that among *all* possible types of facts that we can become acquainted with through distinct sense modalities, none are solely determinative of phenomenological aspects (arguing for a co-determinative framework in these cases, similar to Fish's account of shape phenomenology). This is undoubtedly a significant challenge for selectivists; however, as in the previous section, we do not offer a positive argument against it.

[22] See Clarke and Anaya (2019, p.9) for an analogous principle.

[23] Here, I am disregarding the possibility of overdetermination, which appears to be irrelevant to the present context.

.

.

Selectivism and "subjective" phenomenology

Given the situation presented in Sections 2 and 3, one might assume that the most effective approach against selectivism is to present challenges and hope that they are insurmountable. However, as I announced in the Introduction, the main contribution of this paper is to argue that this is not the case, by providing positive arguments against selectivism/objectivism. Firstly, I think that we can give a positive account when we consider a phenomenological fact of perceptions that is frequently recognized as characteristic of sensations, but less commonly acknowledged as typical of perceptions.

Note that a plausible way to characterize the phenomenology of sensations could successfully separate the "objective" aspects of sensations (such as the property of being a pain of a certain intensity and quality[24]) from the "subjective" aspects (such as the property of being "located" in a particular body part)[25]. Broadly speaking, the former pertains to where the pain is "felt", while the latter pertains to the pain itself. This classification of phenomenal aspects allows us to say that we feel the "same" ("phenomenologically-objectively" identical) pain in many different body parts. The lesson to be learned here is that the "objective" phenomenal aspects of sensations do not constitute the entirety of their phenomenology.

Something analogous occurs in sensory phenomenology, as seen in tactile perceptions. For instance, when you touch the same object in the same way with one hand and then the other, you have two perceptions with identical "objective" phenomenologies, but there is a difference in subjective feeling. In one case, you feel the object as if it were touched with your right hand, and in the other, you feel the object as if it were touched with your left hand. Phenomenologically, these experiences are different, despite sharing some partial phenomenological features, the "objective" ones.

Although not so evident as in the tactile case, this phenomenological distinction seems ubiquitous among sensory experiences. Smith (2002, p.134), for example, characterizes the "spatiality" of perception (according to him, an essential property of "perceptual consciousness") as follows:

> The more precise notion of spatiality that we require, therefore, is one that essentially involves not just the spatial relationships between the objects of awareness, but the spatiality of the relationship between any such object and ourselves— more specifically, a part of our body. In vision, for example, objects are characteristically seen, when genuine perceptual consciousness is involved, as more or less distant from us—specifically, from our eyes (or eye). And sounds are heard as being at varying distances from us—specifically from our ears (or ear). Although sight and hearing, unlike touch, are standardly regarded as "distance senses," the same kind of spatiality is also found in touch. Although when we feel an object that object is usually felt as being in contact with us, we feel it to be a threedimensional solid body localized beyond our body's surface. What is crucial is precisely this spatial over-againstness with which perceptual objects are given to awareness: an over-againstness which involves a part of our body functioning as sense-organ. Perception concerns the "external world." The suggestion is that this is, in essential part, because perceptual experience presents such "external" objects as literally external—to our bodies.

Here, it is not the place for addressing the nature of the "subjective" contribution (in opposition to a purely "objective" one) in sensory phenomenology, nor is it my point to argue

[24] E.g., being a throbbing pain, being a sharp pain, etc.
[25] See Jackson (1977).

specifically for Smith's account. However, it is undeniable that the phenomenology of perception involves a relation of "over-againstness" between the object as perceived and a phenomenologically subjective element, a sense organ (phenomenologically conceived), as Smith described. Hence, we experience things as if they are in reference to a particular sense organ. Things are felt as if they are touched with my right hand, and we hear and see things as if from our heads. As a result, perceptual phenomenology is not exhaustively describable as "it looks [feels, etc.] to S as if x [an environmental thing] is F, G…". Rather, such a description would have to tell us about the above-mentioned reference to the subject[26].

These purely phenomenal distinctions motivate prima facie, for any theorist that aims to explain sensory phenomenologies, the introduction of internal properties. Specifically, one would argue that it is impossible to explain these phenomenal variations in simple terms of acquaintance with such-and-such environmental facts. After all, how could (purely environmental facts, or their combination, explain why I feel something as if it was touched by my right hand and not as if it was touched by my left one? This would suggest that explanations mentioning only acquaintance with such-and-such a kind of environmental facts can only concern the objective part of sensory phenomenology (e.g., something's looking red and round, etc.), but never the subjectively referred phenomenological facts (e.g., something's being seen as if "from" one's head, etc.).

However, objectivists could quickly object that this generalization is not licit, observing that there are purely phenomenological-subjective variations that are arguably accounted for by physical facts[27]. As I showed above, Fish explains the part of visual phenomenology corresponding to "felt distances" (which Smith evoked) by simple appeal to perspectival facts. Something similar could be said about hearing from a distance[28].

The problem is that in many cases, we cannot plausibly attribute the difference in sensory experiences to a difference in acquainted facts. For example, if I touch my pen with my right hand and then touch it in the same way with my left hand, the sensation of a hard, long, cylindrical object would be present in both cases[29]. However, in one case, I would feel as if I were touching the pen with my left hand, and in the other case, I would feel as if I were touching it with my right hand. Let us call the corresponding total phenomenologies P^1 and P^2, respectively. The distinction of partial (subjective, in this case) phenomenological aspects leads to an evident difference between P^1 and P^2. But what kind of environmental facts could we be acquainted with when touching an object with one hand but not the other? There does not seem to be a plausible answer to this question.

Nevertheless, antiselectivists do not need to settle for the intuitive lack of explanatory resources that selectivists would face when dealing with these situations. Preliminarily, however, I have to show why selectivists cannot simply be silent on the answer to the question in the previous paragraph. In particular, selectivists cannot simply say, "there are distinct combinations of facts that make up, respectively, the PFP relative to P^1 and the PFP relative to

[26] This general discussion is also present in Peacocke (1992).

[27] It is not clear whether the variations in sensory phenomenology are solely subjective and phenomenological or if they also involve "modes of over-againstness" (distantly, closely, etc.) not reducible to other aspects, However, for the purposes of this paper, the subjective-objective distinction in perceptual phenomenology is sufficient.

[28] Perhaps, they would have a hard time when it comes to phenomena like explaining hearing something as in front or behind oneself, once no distinct spatial relation would be available here.

[29] I used tactile experiences as examples because their phenomenology is easier to grasp in terms of the subjective factor. However, variations in over-againstness are ubiquitous. For instance, imagine that your eyes were magically placed on your belly. Even if your body were moved so you are now staring at the same scene you were before, you would not see it as if "from" your head.

.

.

P^2, end of story", in a manner similar to what current selectivists might say when faced with the challenges presented in Sections 2 and 3 (at least until those challenges are adequately addressed).

Here is why this would be an illegal move. We fairly expect, for every explanatory theory (T) of a certain class (C), that T does not merely generically indicate that a certain set of entities (E) is such that its members account for each member of C. Rather, at least in a possible future development, T should also be able to specify *which* member of E explains a given particular member of C, given unlimited information about the situation in which that C member is found. This is not to say, however, that T must currently have all the means to ground this kind of judgment, but it should not be deemed unattainable. If an explanatory theory admits to having such a handicap, it is in a poor dialectical situation.

The problem is that we have reasons to believe that selectivists *cannot* account for P^1 and P^2 in this particular manner. For, choosing any explanans for P^1 that fails to account for P^2 would be arbitrary for selectivists. This is because there is nothing in the situation involving (say) P^1, which is absent in the one involving P^2, that could indicate to selectivists a specific environmental fact, which they would elect as composing the corresponding acquaintance and PFP. According to our stipulations, the differences between the respective situations as a whole are solely with regard to the (subjective) phenomenologies and the functioning of the relevant sense organs. However, none of these distinctions is capable of providing the adequate basis for selecting an environmental fact that would do the determinative work relative to P^1 without applying to P^2 in the same way.

When it comes to the phenomenologies, there seems to be no evident natural affinity between specific (kinds of) environmental facts and only one of those subjective phenomenologies (even in combination with the "objective" phenomenology), which selectivists could use to choose the required explanans in a non-arbitrary way.

The present case differs from, e.g., selectivist explanations that rely on perspectival facts. For example, if two subjects were in an identical environment that contains a cube, selectivists could non-arbitrarily indicate that the appearance (relative to one subject) of the square as a large object is related to specific perspectival facts, while the appearance (relative to another subject) of it as a small object is related to distinct perspectival facts. One could argue that for only one of these subjects, the phenomenology naturally matches the relevant projection of the cube available in the environment in accordance with relevant geometric laws, while in the other case, it does not. Thus, choosing that specific perspectival fact (among all the other ones that the environment contains) as something that the corresponding subject becomes acquainted with is not an arbitrary move.

Nonetheless, there is nothing differentiating P^1 and P^2, except for their subjective components, namely the hand to which they refer (right in P^1, left in P^2). Surely, this kind of subjective reference does not correspond (in any relevant way for its election as a correlative object of acquaintance) to any specific environmental fact, let alone correspond in a way that the reference to another analogous organ, as in P^2, would not.

The other distinction between the situations containing P^1 and P^2 is the functioning of the relevant sense organs[30]. Once again, there is no evident natural correspondence between the functioning of a specific tactile organ (say, my right hand) and a certain specific fact in the environment that would not apply to the functioning of a distinct tactile sense organ (my left

[30] Now, I am not talking about "phenomenological" sense organs (i.e., that which the subject feels as being over-against the objects of perceptions insofar as it is felt) but about "biological" sense organs. In the present case, this may include not only the relevant part skin, with its nerve endings, but also all the causal paths involved in the corresponding sensory process.

.

.

hand)[31]. It is even possible to design the present cases so that all the (causal, functional, etc.) relations that the right hand keeps with the environment are precisely the same as the one my right (in the moment they touch the pen) does. So, no candidate correspondence between the hand and a certain environmental fact could ground the selection of a distinctive fact to compose the relevant acquaintance.

Given that the differences between the cases of P^1 and P^2 are solely related to phenomenology and sense organs, neither of which can adequately justify the exclusive choice for an environmental fact to compose the relevant acquaintance, then any attempt to do so would be arbitrary and ad hoc, and therefore unacceptable. Thus, selectivism lacks the *potential* resources to provide the exact explanans in these cases and is therefore an unsatisfactory explanatory theory of perceptual phenomenology.

An anonymous reviewer at Erkenntnis (to whom I am very grateful) has noted that this argument may not be decisive against selectivists as they could avoid its conclusion by adopting one of two positions.

Firstly, they could argue that the "subjective" phenomenology I referred to is not instantiated by the perceptual event itself but instead by a sensation that necessarily accompanies every perception, albeit not overlapping with it. Since the argument raised no issues against selectivists' ability to handle "objective" phenomenology, it poses no threat to these selectivists.

Nevertheless, I believe antiselectivists can reject this suggestion as to how to count mental events because it seems that we are obliged to abductively choose the conventional account of perceptions as instantiating subjective phenomenology over it. This account is simpler, more economical, and non-ad hoc. Furthermore, it is implausible to think that there is a sensation accompanying every event because sensations typically have their own "objective" phenomenology, such as the "objective pain" as I mentioned at the beginning of the present section. However, we do not observe such a phenomenological aspect when we have a perception.

The second option for selectivism would be to reject the definition of "objectivism" provided in the Introduction and reformulate it to include PNRs that, more weakly, individuate PFPs by reference to *whatever* the perceiver becomes acquainted with. In this case, since we are dealing with Naïve Realism (as opposed to Sense Data Theories), the reference would be to acquaintable mind-independent things in general, not limited to environmental things. Under this new formulation, objectivists can ideally individuate PFPs at least partially by acquaintance with material things that are located under the perceiver's skin, such as sense organs.

In light of this, selectivists could potentially counter the argument above by suggesting that the difference between P^1 and P^2 can be explained by a difference in the perceiver's acquaintance with facts related to their sense organs. According to this view, on the basis of the subjective component of P^1 (i.e., its reference to the perceiver's right hand) one could attribute to the perceiver's acquaintance with a fact concerning their right hand, which would not apply to P^2. It should be noted that (distinctly from those possible attempts to differentiate P^1's and P^2's PFPs by some environmental fact) the selection of this particular fact is not arbitrary, as there is an evident correspondence between the selected fact and the relevant phenomenological reference to it. This correspondence only occurs between the perceiver's right hand and (because of its subjective component) P^1, making the exclusive selection of this fact non-arbitrary.

[31] At least if they have equivalent discriminatory capacities (i.e., every environmental change that yields a phenomenological change for one of them would yield a phenomenological change for another).

.

.

In fact, the idea that we can become acquainted with components and processes of our body is not new. One of the prominent contemporary accounts of sensations is based on this idea (ARMSTRONG, 1962, 1968; PITCHER, 1970, 1971). However, what is novel is a naïve realist claim that, in sensory perception[32], we can become acquainted with internal things. Although naïve realists, now considered as a whole (and not restricted to PNR), sometimes do not explicitly refer to the objects of acquaintance as environmental – saying, for example, that they are "physical" (MILLAR, 2015), "mind-independent" (GENONE, 2016), or "material" (PRICE, 1964) –, in context, these authors actually refer to things outside the perceiver. It is no wonder the objects of acquaintances are often considered the same as the objects of sensory perception, which are naturally limited to environmental things.

This is why I initially defined objectivism as specifically individuating PNRs based on environmental things. However, in fact, there is room for arguing (once one motivates the possibility of acquaintance with facts relative to sense organs in sensory perceptions) that the broader characterization is in line with the natural spirit of "objectivism", as it individuates PNR in accordance with what the perceiver is acquainted with.

The conclusion of the present section is that selectivists need to propose a new general type of naïve realism, which admits that sensory perceptions may involve acquaintance with sense organs. However, even with this modification, selectivists' life is not a bed of flowers.

For, there are many facts relative to sense organs whose acquaintance we would plausibly expect to generate objective phenomenology. For example, a reasonable interpretation of the selectivist view would propose that when one looks in the mirror with the fact that their eyes are in fact located in their head. Therefore, this type of fact could not be the one whose acquaintance partially determines the rest of the ordinary visual experiences, where one sees things as if one's head.

In this case, if selectivists wish to maintain their position, they would likely have two options. Firstly, they could come up with a justification for why, in those cases (contrary to our intuitions), what partially determines one's phenomenology is not a fact relative to sense organs. For example, they may argue that in cases like the one involving looking at the mirror, we only become acquainted with color and shape rather than facts about sense organs. Second, they could introduce a subclass of facts relative to sense organs that do not provide that kind of determination, and justify this. So, although selectivists can account for differences in subjective phenomenology, they still face some challenges.

Objectivists cannot account for shifted spectra

In light of the above discussion, one should notice that presenting a definitive case against objectivism/selectivism is harder than one might initially expect. Surely, selectivists should not underestimate the weight of the challenges raised, especially since there seem to be no forthcoming answers. However, antiselectivists will certainly benefit from a conclusive argument against selectivism. The goal of this section is to provide a reasoning of this kind.

To start, consider the possibility that two distinct subjects (S^1 and S^2) with the same color discrimination capacities might have, at the same time, significantly different color phenomenologies when gazing at the same part of the environment. For instance, if they were to

[32] For the remainder of this section, I will use the term "sensory perception" to refer specifically to the ordinary perception that occurs through our sense organs and is directed towards external objects. This is to differentiate it from broader uses of the term "perception," such as those used by the authors mentioned, who consider sensations to be "perceptions" of bodily things.

look at a homogenously painted wall, they would S^1 have a color experience that is phenomenologically identical to what you experience when staring at (what you recognize as) a homogenously painted blue wall, whereas S^2's phenomenology would be the same as the one you would have when looking at a red wall. However, if the hue of the wall's color were to be altered, resulting in a change in the phenomenology of S^1, then S^2 would always experience an analogous phenomenological change if S^2 were in the same situation and vice versa.

(Here, it is important to emphasize that the discrimination capacities being referred to here are in terms of phenomenal experiences rather than cognitive or epistemological ones. That is, two different subjects S^1 and S^2 have the same color discrimination capacities iff if S^1 had a color phenomenology change because of some environmental change, then the same environmental change would yield a phenomenological color variation relative to S^2 and vice versa. There is no relative "colorblindness" here.)

To account for this possibility, selectivists would need to argue that S^1 and S^2 became acquainted with distinct facts. Of course, antiselectivists may argue that selectivists would have to give an arbitrary answer when asked to specify the acquaintances that differentiate S^1 and S^2. However, even that generic[33] explanation is not available to them. There is a modification in this possibility that would provide antiselectivists with a definite conclusion against selectivists. Here's how they could proceed:

First, they would argue that there can be an infinite number of subjects with the same discrimination capacities, yet each would have a distinct color phenomenology in the same environment. This assumption is partially based on the idea that there are infinite possible color phenomenologies. This seems plausible, since there do not appear to be any metaphysical constraints on the variation of phenomenological color.

If further justification is required for this premise, consider the possibility of subjects with increasingly more nuanced color perceptions. We can always imagine a subject that can detect more colors in the environment than another, and therefore has the ability to be aware of more phenomenological colors. However, there are no a priori limits to color detection, other than "objective" colors themselves, which appear to be ideally infinite. Just as we can imagine a creature with greater color-detecting abilities than humans, experiencing phenomenologically distinct perceptions when exposed to light reflection at 600THz and 600.01 THz, we can imagine even more discriminating subjects who would experience a phenomenological variation when experiencing light at 600THz and 600.001 THz, and so on. This suggests that color phenomenology is possibly infinite.

Therefore, it is possible that there are infinite subjects who, if placed in an identical environmental situation (such as the wall scenario mentioned earlier), would experience different colors. This is because there is no metaphysical connection between a particular environmental feature and a specific set of phenomenologies. In our world, there may be a high likelihood that light reflection at 600THz would result in a phenomenological color similar to what we perceive as blue. However, this is only a contingent fact based on our specific evolutionary history and as such could have been otherwise.

Finally, antiselectivists would argue there is nothing inherently problematic with those infinite subjects' having the same color discrimination capacities. For, they (S^1, S^2, etc.) could be arranged in a continuum where for each, subject (S^i) is such that for every situation containing light reflected with a certain wave frequency where S^i would always experience of the same

[33] As opposed to the "specific" type of explanations that were discussed in the previous section.

.

.

phenomenological color as the preceding subject (S^{i+1}) if S^{i+1} were in a situation of a slightly smaller wave frequency of the light reflected (compared to the situation being considered for S^i).

Therefore, antiselectivists can reasonably conclude that there can be an infinite number of subjects with the same discrimination capacities but with distinct color phenomenology in the same environment. The next step is to recognize that the number of relevant[34] environmental facts in the wall situation cannot keep up with the number of phenomenologically distinct possible subjects. This does not seem a difficult thing to demonstrate, since the candidate facts here – whatever they exactly are –, and their possible combination, are finite. If so, then selectivists cannot see a possible distinction of acquainted things among those subjects. Selectivists are literally short of resources to explain such a phenomenological distinction. The natural diagnostic here is that PNRs should search for PFPs that are not exclusively individuated by environmental facts.

Before concluding the argument against selectivists, it is worth addressing some potential objections they may have.

One way out for them would be to claim that they are the kind of selectivists who *only* explain the phenomenology of veridical perceptions. As I demonstrated in Note 1, it is optional for PNRs to explain the phenomenology of illusions by appealing to naïve-realistic properties. Therefore, selectivists could indicate that only one of those possible subjects is having a veridical perception (whose phenomenology would be easily explained by Fish's environmental colors). All the other ones would be having "subjective" color illusions, yellow-eye type of situation[35]. For these selectivists, the corresponding phenomenologies can be explained by, e.g., also mentioning subjective properties[36].

Preliminarily, note that it is quite natural to claim that if x is an F illusion[37], then there is a y, such that is not really F, but x's phenomenology represents y as being F[38]. In other words,

[34] Here I assume that selectivists would posit *physical* facts (relational or not) as the candidates for acquaintance. Of course, "the fact" that something is such that 2+2=4 and the like (which are indeed plausibly infinite) can be seen (probably by a maximalist about universals) as a fact that is instantiated in the environment. However, no one would expect us to get acquainted with this kind of thing. I also right away deemed as implausible explanations that would "take advantage of" the infinity of rational numbers and the fact that physical quantities are measurable. They may use, e.g., the "fact" that such-and-such part of the wall is 1cm, the "fact" that such-and-such part of the wall is 0,1 cm, the "fact" that such-and-such part of the wall is 0,01cm and so on (or the fact that such-and-such part of the wall is 0,1 cm from such-and-such another part of the wall, etc.). Other selectivist attempts to take advantage of the infinity of rational numbers may include saying that relational properties between points of space (e.g., *being 2 inches away from…*) could help to explain the relevant phenomenological difference. All these options, however, get into the same kind of troubles I announced in the arguments in Section 4. For, there is no intuitive natural affinity between some fact of one of these kinds and only one the subjects in the environmentally identical situation making these attempts ad hoc and therefore unacceptable.

[35] Cases where the subject, e.g., sees an "objectively" white wall as yellow because of her jaundice (which has a similar effect as she was wearing yellow lenses).

[36] Campbell's account would be an option here: "Suppose we have a medium which, like glass, can be transparent. But suppose that, unlike glass, it is highly volatile, and needs constant adjustment and recalibration if it is to remain transparent in different contexts. Suppose, in fact, that the adjustment required is always sensitive to the finest details of the scene being viewed. […] [T]he upshot of the adjustment is simply that the medium becomes transparent. You might think of visual processing as a bit like that. It is […] that there is a kind of complex adjustment that the brain has to undergo, in each context, in order that you can be visually related to the things around you; so that you can see them, in other words. If we think of visual processing in this way, we can, of course, acknowledge that the adjustment and recalibration may not always yield full transparency. You may be looking at the world with a jaundiced eye, so that everything you see seems to have a yellowish cast". (CAMPBELL, 2002, p.119). According to this account, when we have a veridical perception, there is no "subjective interference" between us and the object of perception in the corresponding acquaintance. In this case, we can explain the corresponding phenomenology only by appealing to the object (and its properties). But there might be (illusory) cases where the corresponding phenomenology is also explained by a "subjective" factor that combines with the objective ones to generate the relevant complete phenomenology.

[37] Which exactly is the property whose instantiations make some color phenomenology accurate is irrelevant for present purposes. They can be the same one as the selectivist attributes as being acquainted with by the perceiver or not.

[38] Which is the natural spelling out of the slogan "x appears to be what it is not", which traditionally describes illusions of x.

.

.

x's phenomenology inaccurately represents y as an F. Conversely, veridical perceptions' phenomenology, on the other hand, cannot show something x as being an F if x is not an F.

The present strategy adopted by selectivists involves positing a difference in the veridical perceptive/illusory status of the experiences. This would require a difference in accuracy assessment between these experiences based on the representational interpretation of the veridical/illusory difference mentioned earlier. Accuracy assessment depends on the situation/world in which the representation is located and its accuracy conditions. Since accuracy conditions are defined by the representational content itself and the (environmental[39]) situation is the same for all subjects, selectivists would plausibly have to acknowledge a difference in representational content across the experiences.

The issue is that there does not seem to be any viable options for determining mental content that could justify the claim that there is a difference in representational content among the subjects, at least one that would result in a difference in accuracy between them. Put differently, there are no internal or external factors in (say) the situation of S^1 that could support the view that S^1's phenomenology is *the* accurate one.

In the first place, external factors alone are insufficient to indicate that there must be a content distinction among subjects. If we consider historical factors, we can design situations with no environmental variations whatsoever, including the subjects' ontogenetics and phylogenetics (or culture). For instance, we can imagine subjects that are spontaneously generated in each situation, with no associated history. Additionally, we can assume that these subjects have the same associated dispositions. Given that the subjects have the same phenomenal color discrimination capacities and are identical in every aspect except for their specific position in the spectra array, it is not reasonable to expect their respective phenomenologies to involve distinct causal powers and propensities in the same context[40].

The aforementioned similarities between the subjects also imply that there are no distinguishable patterns of responses[41], whether they be in the past, future, counterfactual, or otherwise. Likewise, there are no distinguishable patterns of stimulation[42]. In other words, all interactions between the organisms and their environment when experiencing the relevant phenomenologies or associated states are expected to be the same[43]. Hence, externalism about the mind fails to provide the necessary tools to differentiate between the representational contents across the situations, let alone one that would result in a divergence in accuracy.

Appealing to internal factors also seems not to do the trick. Firstly, similarly to the argument presented in Section 4, it is clear that there is no natural and exclusive connection between a specific phenomenological color, even in combination with other partial phenomenological facts that forms the corresponding total phenomenology, and some particular fact in the environment that would allow us to claim that such a phenomenology is the only one represent it. Among the present scenarios, the relevant relations, such as causal, locational, "similarity" etc., between the phenomenologies and aspects of the environment are equivalent[44].

[39] In Note 46, I will address the possible attempt to attribute the desired difference in accuracy conditions to the distinction in the "internal" situation among the subjects.

[40] This is a very well- established conclusion from shifted-spectra cases (COLE, 1990).

[41] Of course, considering that effects that involve other mental representations also help to specify representational contents will not help selectivists.

[42] This kind of factor is, e.g., in Burge's (2005, 2011) ability-general element in representational states.

[43] So extended-mind mind accounts on extended-mind (see CLARK & CHALMERS (1998)) conception and 4E cognition theories (see NEWEN; DE BRUIN; GALLAGHER 2018)) cannot also see content distinctions between these phenomenologies.

[44] In particular, any probabilistic relation between a particular color phenomenology and a specific environmental fact is contingent on the actual world, not extensible to merely possible scenarios, such as those under consideration.

Furthermore, in a similar manner, while the brain processes and biological setups of all these subjects may differ to some extent[45], none of them seem to have a special affinity to some specific environmental fact in a way that would allow us to posit a corresponding distinctive representation.

Therefore, it appears that internalism about mental content lacks the resources to account for a difference between the representational content of these phenomenologies, at least the ones about environmental things. As a result, no divergence in phenomenological accuracy can be inferred from them.

In fact, there are ways to consider that experiences with distinct phenomenological colors (that are otherwise phenomenologically equivalent) must have distinct contents, but in this case, the contents are not exclusively about environmental things. Within the literature, the two primary options are relationism and primitivism. The relational approach holds that in an experience containing a certain phenomenological color, the world is represented as causing or being disposed to cause that an experience with that phenomenological aspect (Shoemaker, 1994, 2006). On the other hand, the primitivist approach claims that, in an experience of a certain phenomenological color, the world is represented as having an intrinsic and non-reducible feature, which exclusively corresponds to that phenomenal color[46] (THAU, 2002).

However, it is unclear how these kinds of difference in content could lead to a difference in accuracy between the present situations. For the relationist, all the present experiences must be veridical in the relevant regard since the object represented cause, and is thus disposed to cause, the respective color phenomenology. On the other hand, the primitivist lacks the resources to non-arbitrarily indicate which intrinsic property experientially attributed among all the distinct episodes is the one the wall really instantiates[47].

Consequently, the argument presented cannot be refuted by appealing to a difference in the illusory/veridical status between the cases.

The final way that selectivists may try to counter the argument presented is by adopting a strategy similar to the one they used in Section 4, which attributes the phenomenal difference to a difference in acquaintance with internal elements between subjects. Specifically, they could claim that in perception, we are acquainted with some type of brain process that is exclusive to the phenomenology in question, thus explaining the distinctions in phenomenology. Similar to the previous case, this would overcome the issue of providing a ground for choosing, for each case, an exclusive fact to the subject become acquainted with, as each of these facts is in a causal relation (or, more comprehensively, in a mind-brain "interaction" relation) exclusively with the relevant episode.

This suggestion faces multiple problems. Firstly, the acquaintance relation seems to require an epistemic relation, commonly referred to as an "opportunity to gain knowledge", with the acquainted entities (ZIĘBA, 2021; RALEIGH, 2020). However, it is evident that we cannot

[45] Although it may be questioned whether this is a metaphysical necessity.

[46] *That* property that wall appears to intrinsically have in the corresponding experience (which would be introspectively different in relation to the property that the wall appears to have in experience with shifted spectra).

[47] Selectivists may try to explain the difference in accuracy conditions by pointing to situational factors rather than differences in representations themselves. This is because the situations in question are strictly different, even though they are environmentally identical but internally distinct, as shown. In this case, they would have to admit phenomenal color content as being about internal facts, which, additionally, only occur in one of the present situations. However, any similar choice would be blatantly arbitrary.

gain any knowledge about a brain process (even if we understand all the relevant concepts) when we perceive a monochromatic wall[48].

Secondly, it is unclear how the introduction of acquaintance with brain process would not render acquaintance with environmental facts explanatorily redundant. If we admit that acquaintance with the brain process can explain phenomenal states, then what role is left for acquaintance with traditional environmental objects? Selectivists might attempt to sidestep this issue by claiming that we are only acquainted with the neurological facts responsible for phenomenological color, while other aspects, such as shape phenomenology, are explained by acquaintance with traditional environmental things. Thus, what S^1 would be acquainted with is only what is causally responsible for her unique phenomenological color, but not with the brain process causally responsible for the subjects' shared shape phenomenology.

However, this modification cannot save selectivism from the screening-off problem mentioned above. If they admit that one becomes acquainted with a neurological fact (b^1) that causes a specific aspect of phenomenology, such as phenomenal colors, it is reasonable to expect that the same would apply to another neurological fact (b^2) that causes other types of phenomenal aspect, such as shape phenomenology. For, all the situational grounds to could apply to selecting b^1 as an object of acquaintance also seem to apply to b^2. There is no non-contingent relation that is instantiated between b^1 and the respective situation that would not analogously apply between b^2 and its situation that could possibly exclusively ground the desired choice. Therefore, one may conclude that the corresponding exclusive selection of b^1 is groundless and, as such, arbitrary and unacceptable. The mandatory move, once one acknowledges acquaintance with b^1, is to also admit acquaintance with b^2[49].

With these objections to the argument from shifted spectra addressed, we can now justifiably assert that PNR must be non-selectivist, and not merely that selectivism face (although serious) challenges. Furthermore, the present argument is easily generalizable to any form of objectivism, as it is not essentially dependent on the specific ontological category one chooses for the acquaintance's objective relata. In conclusion, we can now state that *explanatory phenomenal naïve realism must be non-objectivist*.

Conclusion: should PNR be subjectivist?

Based on that, one might suggest (as it recently was) that PNRs must introduce a three-place acquaintance relation. In addition to the two traditional slots, its instantiations would include the "standpoint from which" the subject is acquainted with objects (BREWER, 2011, 2013; CAMPBELL, 2009, 2011, 2016). This would allow for PFPs to be individuated by also (kinds of) things that occupy this relation slot.

However, this kind of proposal has some drawbacks. A first concern arises from how to delineate "standpoints". Indeed, since it was originally introduced to deal with type 2) TROs (as shown in Section 2), it was thought to include spatial relations (between the subject and the object perceived). Nonetheless, as TROs proliferated, authors started to make standpoints containing multiple distinct factors, such as temporal positions, sense modalities, attentional resources,

[48] Distinctly from the supposed case of acquaintance with sense organs, in which we could plausibly be able to know something about the corresponding body part.

[49] If selectivists were to embrace this conclusion and claim that the only things we are acquainted with in perception are these neurological factors, it would sidestep the screening off problem mentioned above. However, it would be an illegitimate move since it would potentially identify them as a type of physicalist Sense Data Theory, which is inherently incompatible with naïve realism as a whole.

.

.

lighting conditions, obstacles, etc. In this case, since these things do not share any distinctive property, PNR advocates seem to introduce a classification that merely reflects human interests. Standpoints are not, to this extent, akin to natural classes. Rather, as far as "standpoints" is conceived in this way, its introduction falls prey to non-objectivity since it is "settled [...] by fiat or arbitration" (ELLIS, 2001, p.17). In fact, its proponents seem to be able to include anything they want under this classification.

What is even worse, the only motivating factor for including a certain type of thing under the umbrella term "standpoint" seems to be its capacity to handle TROs and parallel worries regarding objectivist PNRs. In this case, we can deem the present approach as ad hoc and thus unacceptable.

Another issue with this approach is that it requires giving up on an appealing aspect of naïve realism, namely the use of an easily understandable predicate ("... is acquainted with...") for any ordinary language speaker. For, the meaning of this predicate can be easily understood through translations or quasi-translations of familiar predicates, such as "... is presented to...", "... is manifested to...", etc. However, the three-place "acquaintance" relation introduced by PRNs lacks any ordinary language equivalent. Therefore, not only are PRNs that use the three-place acquaintance relation at a disadvantage compared to those that use the traditional acquaintance relation by not defining their primitive concepts in terms of familiar terms of ordinary language, but it is also unclear how to define their acquaintance predicate at all.

In the light of all these objections, appealing to "standpoints" should be last the resource for PNRs.

However, it seems that PNRs do not need such a desperate measure. As Logue (2012, p.222) suggests, naïve realists "can appeal to both relata in accounting for the phenomenal character of veridical experience". This means that PFPs of PNRs can be individuated not only by the properties of the acquainted things, but also by the properties of the acquainting subject. PNRs. Call "subjectivism" PNRs whose phenomenal explanations[50] use PFPs with this kind of identity conditions.

In this case, many distinct subjective properties can be appealed to do the relevant explanatory role. The most natural candidates are properties that concern "how the subject's attention is distributed"[51] (CHRISTY, 2019, p. 2182), idiosyncrasies of their visual system, sense modalities, and conceptual powers (ALLEN, 2013; BREWER, 2013, FRENCH, 2014; FRENCH & GOMES, 2016, 2019; PACE, 2007). Recently, it has been suggested that neuro-computational properties are also fit for this job (BECK, 2019).

Specifying PFPs like this can make PNR easily overcome both positive and negative issues presented against objectivists without having the drawbacks of adding a third slot to the acquaintance relation. For, PRN advocates are no longer required to believe that there are necessary distinctions of acquainted things wherever there is a phenomenological difference. For example, having such-and-such phenomenological "coloring" neurological process can explain the phenomenological distinction between the subjects in Section 5 in a non-arbitrary fashion[52].

[50] This expression refers to explanations (of the "in virtue of" kind) in which phenomenological facts are the explananda.

[51] Therefore, the mixed naive realist PFP-theorist can give an alternative account for 6).

[52] In contrast to attempts to select certain "environmental" properties as relative to a specific phenomenological color (which I deemed as lacking any exclusive and natural affinity), selecting neurological factors is non-arbitrary, as they have exclusive and natural connections with the relevant event, such as a causal one.

.

.

References

ALLEN, K. Blur. *Philosophical Studies*, v. 162, p. 257–273, 2013.
ARMSTRONG, D. *Bodily Sensations*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962.
ARMSTRONG, D. *A Materialist Theory of the Mind*. New York: Humanities Press, 1968.
AUDI, P. Grounding: Toward a Theory of the In-Virtue-Of Relation. *Journal of Philosophy*, v. 109, p. 685-711, 2012a.
AUDI, P. *A clarification and defense of the notion of grounding*. In: CORREIA, F.; SCHNIEDER, B. (Eds.). *Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012b. p. 101-121, 2012b.
AYER, A. *The Problem of Knowledge*. Middlesex: Penguin, 1956.
BECK, O. Rethinking naive realism. *Philosophical Studies*, v. 176, p. 607-633, 2019.
BREWER, B. *Perception and its objects*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
BREWER, B. Attention and Direct Realism. *Analytic Philosophy*, v. 54, p. 421–435, 2013.
BURGE, T. Disjunctivism and Perceptual Psychology. *Philosophical Topics*, v. 33, p. 1–78, 2005.
BURGE, T. Disjunctivism again. *Philosophical Explorations*, v. 14, p. 43-80, 2011.
BYRNE, A. DON'T PANIC: *Tye's Intentionalist Theory of Consciousness*. In: *A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind symposium on Tye's Consciousness, Color, and Content*, 2002.
BYRNE, A. & HILBERT, R. *Colors and reflectances*. In BYRNE, A. & HILBERT R. (Eds.). *Readings on color*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997.
CARRASCO, M., LING, S. & READ, S. Attention alters appearance. *Nature Neuroscience*, v. 7, p. 308–313, 2004.
CASSAM, Q. *Berkeley's Puzzle*. In CAMPBELL, J. & CASSAM, Q. (Eds.). *Berkeley's Puzzle: What Does Experience Teach Us*? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. p. 99-117.
CAMPBELL, J. *Reference and consciousness*. Oxford University Press, 2002.
CAMPBELL, J. *Consciousness and reference*. In MCLAUGHLIN, B., BECKERMANN, A. & WALTER, S. (Eds.). *The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. p. 648–662.
CAMPBELL, J. *Relational vs. Kantian responses to Berkeley's puzzle*. In: ROESSLER, J., LERMAN, H. & EILAN, N. (Eds.). *Perception, causation, and objectivity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. p. 35–50.
CAMPBELL, J. The problem of spatiality for a relational view of experience. *Philosophical Topics*, v. 44, p. 105–120, 2016.
CHALMERS, D. *Perception and the Fall from Eden*. In GENDLER, S. & HAWTHORNE, J. (Eds.). *Perceptual Experience*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. p. 49–125.
CLARK, A & CHALMERS, D. The Extended Mind. *Analysis*, v. 58, p. 7-19, 1998.
CLARKE, S & ANAYA, A. Naïve realism and phenomenal similarity. *Inquiry*, 2019. DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2019.1688183.
COHEN, J. Color Properties and Color Ascriptions: A Relationalist Manifesto. *Philosophical Review*, v. 113, p. 451–506.
COLE, D. Functionalism and inverted spectra. *Synthese*, v. 82, p. 207-22, 1990.
CRANE, T. *Is There a Perceptual Relation?* In: GENDLER, S & HAWTHORNE, J (Eds.). *Perceptual Experiences*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. p. 126–146.
CHRISTY, J. Naïve realism: a simple approach. *Philosophical Studies*, 176, 2167-2185, 2019.
ELLIS, B. *Scientific Essentialism*. Cambridge University Press, 2001.
FISH, W. *Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion*. Oxford University Press, 2009.
GENONE, J. Recent Work on Naive Realism. *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 53, 1-25, 2016.

.
.

GIBSON, J. *The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966.
FRENCH, C. Naive Realist Perspectives on Seeing Blurrily. *Ratio*, 27, 393–413, 2014.
FRENCH, C., & A. GOMES. On the Particularity of Experience. *Philosophical Studies*, 173, 451–460, 2016.
FRENCH, C., & A. GOMES. How Naïve Realism Can Explain Both the Particularity and the Generality of Experience. *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 69, 41–63, 2019.
HILL, C. *Consciousness*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
JACKSON, Frank. *Perception: A Representative Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
KENNEDY, M. *Explanation in Good and Bad Experiential Cases*. In: MACPHERSON, F & PLATCHIAS, D (Eds.). Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013. p. 221-254.
LANGSAM, H. The intuitive case for naïve realism. *Philosophical Explorations*, 20, 106-122, 2017.
LOGUE, H. Why naïve realism? *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 112, 211–237, 2012.
LOGUE, H. *Experiential Content and Naïve Realism: A Reconciliation*. In: BROGAARD, B (Ed.). *Does Perception Have Content?* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. p. 220–241.
MACK, A., & I. ROCK. *Inattentional Blindness*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998.
MARTIN, M. *The Transparency of Experience*. Mind & Language, 17 (1), 376-425, 2002.
MARTIN, M. *On being alienated*. In: GENDLER, T & HAWTHORNE, J (Eds.). *Perceptual Experience*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. p. 354-410.
MCDOWELL, J. Criteria, defeasibility, and knowledge. *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 68, 455–479, 1982.
MCDOWELL, J. *The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument*. In: HADDOCK, A, & MACPHERSON, F (Eds.). *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. p. 35-56.
MEHTA, N. The Limited Role of Particulars in Phenomenal Experience. *Journal of Philosophy*, 111, 311–331, 2014.
MEHTA, N. & T. GANSON. On the Generality of Experience: A Reply to French and Gomes. *Philosophical Studies*, 173, 3223–3229, 2016.
MILLAR, B. Naïve Realism and Illusion. Ergo: An Open Access *Journal of Philosophy*, 2, 607–625, 2015.
NEWEN, A, DE BRUIN, L & GALLAGHER, S (Eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
NOË, A. *Action in Perception*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004.
NUDDS, M. Recent Work in Perception: Naïve Realism and its Opponents. *Analysis*, 69, 334–346, 2009.
PACE, M. Blurred Vision and the Transparency of Experience. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 88, 328–354, 2007.
PEACOCKE, C. *A study of concepts*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992.
PITCHER, G. Pain Perception. *The Philosophical Review*, 79, 368–393, 1970.
PITCHER, G. *A Theory of Perception*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971.
PRICE, H. *Perception*. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1950.
RAINERI, C. What's so naïve about naïve realism? *Philosophical Studies*, 178, 3637-3657, 2021.
RALEIGH, T. *Introduction*. In: KNOWLES, J & RALEIGH, T. (Eds.) Acquaintance: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. p. 1-30.
SHOEMAKER, S. Phenomenal character. *Noûs*, 28, 21-38, 1994.

.
.

SHOEMAKER, S. *On the Way Things Appear*. In: HAWTHORNE, J (Ed.). *Perceptual Experience*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. p. 461-480.
SIMONS, D. & CHABRIS, C. Gorillas in Our Midst: Sustained Inattentional Blindness for Dynamic Events. *Perception*, 28, 1059–1074, 199
SMITH, A. *The Problem of Perception*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002.
SOTERIOU, M. Perceiving Events. *Philosophical Explorations*, 13, 223–241, 2010.
SOTERIOU, M. *The Mind's Construction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
SOTERIOU, M. *Disjunctivism*. London: Routledge, 2016.
THAU, M. *Consciousness and Cognition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
ZIĘBA, P. Naïve realism about unconscious perception. *Synthese*, 196, 2045-2073, 2019.

Autor(a) para correspondência / Corresponding author: Ícaro Miguel Ibiapina Machado. ícaro_machado@live.com